In this paper, the problem of user association and resource allocation is studied for an integrated satellite-drone network (ISDN). In the considered model, drone base stations (DBSs) provide downlink connectivity, supplementally, to ground users whose demand cannot be satisfied by terrestrial small cell base stations (SBSs). Meanwhile, a satellite system and a set of terrestrial macrocell base stations (MBSs) are used to provide resources for backhaul connectivity for both DBSs and SBSs. For this scenario, one must jointly consider resource management over satellite-DBS/SBS backhaul links, MBS-DBS/SBS terrestrial backhaul links, and DBS/SBS-user radio access links as well as user association with DBSs and SBSs. This joint user association and resource allocation problem is modeled using a competitive market setting in which the transmission data is considered as a good that is being exchanged between users, DBSs, and SBSs that act as "buyers", and DBSs, SBSs, MBSs, and the satellite that act as "sellers". In this market, the quality-of-service (QoS) is used to capture the quality of the data transmission (defined as good), while the energy consumption the buyers use for data transmission is the cost of exchanging a good. According to the quality of goods, sellers in the market propose quotations to the buyers to sell their goods, while the buyers purchase the goods based on the quotation. The buyers profit from the difference between the earned QoS and the charged price, while the sellers profit from the difference between earned price and the energy spent for data transmission. The buyers and sellers in the market seek to reach a Walrasian equilibrium, at which all the goods are sold, and each of the devices' profit is maximized. A heavy ball based iterative algorithm is proposed to compute the Walrasian equilibrium of the formulated market. Analytical results show that, with well-defined update step sizes, the proposed algorithm is guaranteed to reach one Walrasian equilibrium. Simulation results show that, at the achieved Walrasian equilibrium solution, the proposed algorithm can yield a two-fold gain in terms of the number of radio access links with a data rate of over 40 Mbps, and a three-fold gain in terms of the number of backhaul links with a data rate greater than 1.6 Gbps.
budget of each base station (BS), and the fairness among each users, BSs, and the satellite's benefits. Unlike previous market-based solutions such as [22] and [24] that only consider resource allocation among only two communication links which do not include backhaul links, we propose a total payoff maximizing solution that optimizes the sum-rate of the ISDN network, considering the resource allocation for satellite backhaul links, macrocell base station (MBS) backhaul links, and communication links between terrestrial users and their serving small cell base stations (SBSs) or DBSs. Our key contributions include:
• We develop a novel framework to jointly consider resource allocation over satellite-DBS/SBS backhaul links, terrestrial backhaul links, and DBS/SBS-user radio access links as well as user association with DBSs and SBSs within an ISDN. In this system, the SBSs and DBSs provide downlink data service to terrestrial users, while the MBSs, supplemented with a low earth orbit (LEO) satellite system, provide backhaul service to SBSs and DBSs.
• We formulate this joint ISDN user access and resource allocation problem as a competitive market, in which the users request downlink data service with high data rates, while the SBSs and DBSs seek to satisfy these data service requests with minimal power consumption.
Meanwhile, the SBSs and DBSs request a backhaul service with high data rates, while the MBSs and the LEO satellite seek to provide them with a backhaul service with minimal power consumption. A Walrasian equilibrium is applied to solve the formulated market. In this regard, we prove the existence of the Walrasian equilibrium, at which the communication performance in the system are optimized.
• We propose a distributed, iterative algorithm to optimize the data rates at each user, SBS, DBS, MBS and the satellite, based on dual decomposition. Our analytical results show that, with well defined update step sizes, the proposed algorithm is guaranteed to reach a Walrasian equilibrium at which the total payoff gained by all the ISDN devices is maximized.
• The results also show that, the proposed heavy ball based algorithm yields the same performance as a centralized optimization algorithm and a 10% improvement on convergence speed, compared to a sub-gradient algorithm. Simulation results also show that, by considering the Walrasian equilibrium in the market, the proposed algorithm can yield over two-fold gain in terms of the number of radio access links with over 40 Mbps rates, and over three-fold gain in terms of the number of backhaul links with over 1.6 Gbps rates. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The system model are described in Section II.
In Section III, the problem formulation and proposed framework for joint backhaul and access resource management is developed and discussed. In Section IV, numerical simulation results are presented. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a downlink ISND that consists of a set S of S SBSs, a set E of E DBSs supplementing the SBSs, a set M of M MBSs providing terrestrial backhaul links, a LEO satellite constellation providing a satellite backhaul system, and a set U of U users as shown in Fig.   1 . In this system, each user requests data service from either an SBS or a DBS whose hover time is limited by its propulsion energy consumption, while the backhaul connections of the SBSs and DBSs are provided by either the LEO satellite or ground MBSs. Let H n be the hover time of DBS n, defined as the time duration that a DBS can use to hover over a certain area to serve the ground users [25] . Hereinafter, we refer to the DBSs and SBSs in the network as BSs and we define N as the set of N = S + E BSs. The three-dimensional (3D) coordinates of the users, BSs, and MBSs are defined as S 1 = [s 1,1 , · · · , s 1,U ], S 2 = [s 2,1 , · · · , s 2,N ], and S 3 = [s 3,1 , · · · , s 3,M ], respectively. Each element s i,j captures the 3D coordinates of a specific location, i.e., s i,j = (x ij , y ij , f ij ). The satellite will start at an initial location with 3D coordinate s 0 = (x 0 , y 0 , f 0 ), and move in the direction of the x-axis with speed υ.
We assume that the amount of data (in bits) that a user u requests is C u , which has to be Updating step size at iteration k provided to the user within a time duration ∆. During ∆, the BSs also request backhaul data service to download the requested data from the core network. Here, we refer the amount of data that each user requests as data service and the amount of backhaul data that each BS requests as backhaul service. The time required to satisfy each user's data service request and each BS's backhaul service request depends on several factors, including the effective service time and the data rate at the corresponding user and BS. In the considered scenario, all the communication links work over the Ka band (26.5 -40 GHz), which is a well established millimeter wave (mmW) range suitable for satellite communication and future 5G links, as discussed in [26] . A time division multiple access (TDMA) scheme is adopted to support directional transmissions at the significantly high path loss mmW band, while maintaining low complex designs for transceivers [27] . Note that, in this model, as done in [28] , the downlink interference caused by the satellite on the terrestrial links is considered to be negligible due to the satellite's limited transmit power and long-range transmission.
Moreover, the considered time duration ∆ is further divided, by the BSs, MBSs, and satellite into a set T of T time slots, each of which has a time duration of τ . Within duration ∆, each user (for radio transmission) or BS (for backhauling) will be served at least once in at least one time slot which is the effective service time of this user or BS. Note that, among the T time slots in the studied duration ∆, each DBS n ∈ E is only operational for T n = Hn τ time slots, as limited by its hover time. We also assume that each DBS is operational from the start of the studied duration, and will hover at its location for T n time slots. We also assume that the SBSs, MBSs, and satellite will be operational during the whole process. In other words, T n = T , T m = T and T S = T for all n ∈ S and m ∈ M. The data rates at the communication links in the ISDN system are modeled next.
A. Channel Model
In the studied ISDN, the mmWave links are affected by the surrounding obstacles and, thus, these communication links can be either line-of-sight (LoS) or non-line-of-sight (NLoS). The channel gain between transmitter i, which could be a BS, MBS, or the satellite, and its associated user (or BS for backhaul) j is defined as [27] :
where L 1 is the Rician fading channel coefficient, and L 2 (d i,j ) = α + α log 10 d i,j + χ captures the large-scale channel effects over the mmW link between i and j [29] . Here, α is the slope of the fit and α , the intercept parameter, is the path loss (dB) for 1 meter of distance. In addition, χ models the deviation in fitting (dB) which is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance ξ 2 for 1 meter of distance. d i,j is the distance between i and j. For example, if i ∈ U
of an antenna at an offset angle κ i,j , which is defined as:
where Q MM and Q MS are the transmit antenna gains of the main lobe and the side lobe, respectively.
is the half power beam width. κ i,j is the offset angle (from the boresight direction) of i's transmit antenna in the direction of j's receiver antenna. G R (κ j,i ) is the receive gain of an antenna at an offset angle κ j,i , which is defined as:
where Q RM and Q RS are the receive antenna gains of the main lobe and the side lobe, respectively.
is the half power beam width. κ j,i is the offset angle (from the boresight direction) of the link j's receive antenna in the direction of i's transmitter antenna. i,j = 1 indicates that the link between i and j is LoS, otherwise, it is NLoS. In fact, i,j is a Bernoulli random variable with probability of success ι i,j = e φ los d i,j , where φ los is a parameter determined by the density and the average size of the blockage obstacles in the surrounding area. Note that, as done in [30] , we assume that all the users have LoS paths to DBSs as the DBSs are assumed to hover at relatively high altitudes and the probability of having scatterers around DBS-user link is very small. That is, the probability of a LoS path ι i,j = 1 when i ∈ E. Similarly, the probability of LoS path at the satellite backhaul link ι i,j = 1, as j ∈ N and i being the satellite.
In our model, the users and BSs will estimate the interference caused by the surrounding communication links in the system to find the the optimal association and allocation scheme that maximizes their data rates. In particular, the path loss between the interfering BSs or MBSs to the victim users or BSs is estimated based on (1), in which the bore sight angles of interfering transmitters shall be estimated. However, estimating interference in an ISDN is not trivial, as it can yield significant overhead and delay for the users and BSs, so that they can gather information on all resources allocated to neighboring links. Thus, instead of gathering such information, the bore sight angles of interfering transmitters are assumed, at each victim BS or user, to be independently and uniformly distributed in (0, 2π). In such a case, random transmit antenna gain G M (κ i,j ) of interfering transmitters can yield an average value of
The random receive antenna gain G R (κ i,j ) of interfering transmitters can yield an average value of κ R 2π
Q RS . Note that, the average value of transmit antenna gain and receive antenna gain is adopt, respectively, as the value of interfering transmit antenna gain and victim receive antenna gain in all the following interference analysis.
B. Terrestrial Link Data Rate Analysis
Next, we model the transmission links from BSs to users and the backhaul links from MBSs to BSs, which we call terrestrial links hereinafter. The link between a BS n ∈ N and a user u is denoted by I Here, b nu ∈ {0, 1} represents the association state between user u and BS n and z nm ∈ {0, 1}
represents the association state between terrestrial MBS m and BS n, with b nu = 1 and z nm = 1
indicating that user u associates with BS n and BS n associates with MBS m, respectively. We indicating that user u is served by BS n at time slot t, δ nmt = w nmt z nm = 1 indicating that BS n is served by MBS m at time slot t. Recall that each DBS n ∈ E is only operational for T n time slots from the start of the studied period, such that ρ nut = 0, δ nmt = 0, for all u ∈ U, m ∈ M, n ∈ E, and t > T n .
In this case, the interference at link I B n,u that uses time slot t can be expressed as:
where u i , n i , and m i represent, respectively, the terrestrial user, BS, and MBS in link i. P n i is the transmit power of the BS at link i and P m i is the transmit power of the MBS at link i.
Thus, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of link I B n,u is computed as:
where σ 2 is the noise power. The data rate at this link I B n,u will be given by:
where B N is the bandwidth allocated to terrestrial link I B n,u , which is assumed to be equal for all terrestrial links.
The interference at backhaul link I M n,m that uses time slot t is:
Thus, the SINR at this link I M n,m is given as:
The data rate at link I M n,m is c n,m,t (ρ, δ) = B N log (1 + δ nmt γ n,m,t (ρ, δ)).
C. Satellite Communication Link Data Rate Analysis
In the Ka band, a LEO satellite provides a supplemental backhaul connection to the BSs.
The link between the satellite and BS n is represented by I The interference over the backhaul link between BS n and the satellite at slot t ∈ T is:
The SINR of the backhaul links between BS n and a satellite at time interval t ∈ T will be:
where P S is the transmit power of the LEO satellite, which is assumed to be equal for all satellites in constellation. Thus, the data rate of link I S n is:
where B S is the bandwidth allocated to link I S n , which is assumed to be equal for all satellite backhaul links.
Here, we assume that within the studied resource stringent ISDN, each BS or MBS will continuously serve users or BSs during the studied duration ∆. In such a case, the interference in (4) terrestrial link I B n,u can be rewritten as:
Similarly, the interference in (7) at backhaul link I M nu is rewritten as:
Moreover, the interference in (9) at backhaul link I S n is rewritten as:
Thus, the data rates at a terrestrial link I B nu and backhaul links I M nu and I S n will only be a function of the allocation scheme ρ nut , δ nmt , and β nt , respectively.
We also consider QoS requirements at each user in the form of c u (ρ) =
Π u , with c u (ρ) being user u's average data rate over the studied duration, Π u being the minimum rate threshold required by user u. In other words, the average data rate that user u can achieve over the studied duration should never be less than Π u . Meanwhile, each BS n's average backhaul data rate should not be less than threshold
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PROPOSED RESOURCE ALLOCATION FRAMEWORK

A. Problem Formulation
Given the system model of Section II, our goal is to find an effective resource allocation and user association scheme that maximizes the system's data rates, while satisfying the user data service request, under a limited available time resource. However, we note that the resource allocation and association scheme at one user or BS can affects the entire network performance.
In particular, the optimal allocation and association scheme of any given user or BS could yield significant performance degradation at other communication links by introducing interference to these victim links. This directly leads to a decrease in the amount of data provided by these links which, consequently, cannot meet the data service demand from the users. Moreover, while optimizing its own data rate, a user could continuously occupy a BS without considering its time budget. In order to solve the joint access and resource allocation problem among the various communication links in the resource-limited ISDN, we formulate a competitive market [31] which can take into account the QoS needs of every user, BS, MBS, and, also, the satellite. In such a market, the BSs, MBSs and the satellite submit quotations (or prices) for each slot of service. Meanwhile, the users and BSs find the resource allocation and association scheme that is most beneficial for them, that is, the scheme with highest data rate but lowest charged price.
By using a competitive market solution, the intractable many-to-many matching problem, that is, the resource-limited joint access and allocation problem in the ISDN, can be effectively solved.
The problem is solved in a distributed way to prevent excessive overhead and alleviate privacy concerns.
In this model, the primary objective of each user is to find a resource allocation and association scheme that satisfies its data service demand and maximize its data rate, while each BS seeks to find an resource allocation scheme that can provide sufficient data service under the limited time budget. Meanwhile, each BS also seeks to find a resource allocation and association scheme that satisfies its backhaul service demand with maximized data rate. Each MBS, or the satellite, seeks to find a resource allocation scheme that can meet the backhaul service demand within their resource budget. To capture the decision making processes of the users, BSs, MBSs, and the satellite, we introduce a competitive market defined by the tuple [P, ρ, δ, β, θ, ϕ, ε, W, V] to capture the dependence between the supply and the demand of data service. Here,
• P is the set of users, BSs, MBSs and the satellite.
• ρ, δ, and β are the vectors of allocation schemes deployed at BSs, MBSs, and the satellite, respectively.
•
is the request schemes deployed at users, whereby θ nut = 1 implies that user u requests data service from BS n at slot t, otherwise, if θ nut = 0, then user u does not request service from BS n at slot t. ϕ = [ϕ 111 , · · · , ϕ N M T ], and ε = [ε 11 , · · · , ε N T ] are request vectors at each BS, such that ϕ nmt = 1 and ε nt = 1 represent that, at slot t, BS n requests backhaul service from MBS m, and the satellite, respectively.
• W is the set of payoffs of the buyers, which are the users in the radio access links and BSs in the backhaul links.
• V is the set of payoffs of the sellers, which are the BSs in the radio access links, MBSs and the satellite in the backhaul links.
Note that, in our competitive market, user u will pay t∈T q u,n,t ρ nut to seller BS n, BS n will pay t∈T q n,m,t δ nmt to MBS m and pay t∈T q n,S,t β nt to the satellite, as a return for the provided service. Here, q i,j,t is the cost of the time slot t seller j received from buyer i, noted as unit price. Note that, for each buyer, the unit prices of time slots provided by different sellers will vary, as the communication quality provided by different sellers varies. In particular, the buyer will have to pay a higher price to obtain a higher quality service as captured by the data rates in the ISDN system.
Each buyer will use a utility function to measure its profit in the market, which is defined as the normalized difference between its communication quality (i.e. its data rate) and the price it pays to the sellers. Thus, the payoff function of user u can will be:
The payoff function of BS n, as a buyer, is given by:
On the other hand, seller j will receive its payment under the cost P j A j τ , which is the energy it consumed during the data transmission process. Here, P j is the transmit power of executor j.
A j is the total number of time slots that seller j has allocated during the whole process. Thus, the payoff of BS n as an seller is given by:
Note that, the energy consumption of BS n, P n u∈U t∈T ρ nut τ , is normalized by P n τ T , such that the normalized cost of BS n is 1 T u∈U t∈T ρ nut . Similarly, the payoff function of seller m ∈ M will be:
The payoff function of the satellite, as a seller, is:
In the formulated market, each one of the buyer or seller, i.e., an user, BS, MBS, or the satellite will seek to maximize its own payoff. To solve this market, we make use of the concept of Walrasian equilibrium [31] . At this equilibrium, the supply of data and backhaul service from the sellers exactly matches the demand of data and backhaul service at the buyers, with each participants' payoff being maximized at the same time. The concept of a Walrasian equilibrium is formally defined as:
Given the price of the goods (i.e. the data service and the backhaul service), a
Walrasian equilibrium in the considered ISDN competitive market is given by a tuple of vectors
that satisfy the following conditions:
1) For radio access links, θ * is the optimal solution that maximizes the users' payoff in (15) and ρ * is the optimal solution that maximizes the payoff (17), of BSs.
2) For backhaul links, ϕ * , ε * are the solutions that optimize the BSs' payoff in (16) , while δ * and β * optimize the MBSs' and the satellite's payoffs in (18) and (19), respectively.
3) The time slots provided by each seller are exactly matched to the number of time slots requested by the buyers. In other words, ρ
At the Walrasian equilibrium, the communication links' optimal data rates are guaranteed and the clearance of the market is ensured by a full utilization of the time resource in the system, with which payoffs (15)- (19) in the ISDN are optimized [31] . However, improper prices can lead to the mismatch between the time slots provided by each seller and the number of time slots requested by the corresponding buyer. For example, when the prices are low, the users and
BSs will be willing to request as much time slots as possible, yet the BSs, MBS, and satellite could rather not to provide any service at all. As such, a set of optimal prices should yield schemes that fully optimize the individual payoffs (15)- (19) in the system without violating any resource budget and resource demand constraints. In practical ISDN scenarios, each user, BS, MBS, or the satellite may not have the ability to analytically characterize such optimal prices by themselves. To this end, a heavy ball based algorithm, which enables a numerical computation of such optimal prices, is proposed next, which as a result, allows computation of Walrasian equilibrium at which both the payoffs at each devices and the total payoff in the market is reached.
B. Proposed Resource Allocation Algorithm
In this section, the problem of joint access and backhaul resource allocatin is solved in the formulated market which considers the payoffs of all the users, BSs, MBSs, and the satellite at the same time. The constraints, including resource budget, service demand, and QoS requirements, is considered in the market. Here, the total payoff gained by all the users, BSs, MBSs and the satellite in the market is given as:
As such, the joint access and backhaul resource allocation problem is formulated as:
where the maximization problem in (21) captures the total payoff maximization objective in the market, with (21a) indicating that the data service demand of each user, C u , must be satisfied.
Meanwhile, (21b) indicates that one time slot cannot be simultaneously used for backhaul links and radio access links at a BS n, so as to avoid interference between the backhaul and radio that, under the market clearance constraint (21s), the payments from all buyers are returned to the sellers. Hence, the objective function can be simplified as:
C. Dual decomposition
The integer non-linear programming (INLP) optimization problem in (21) can be solved using a dual decomposition method. This stems from the fact that constraints (21a)-(21r) are local constraints at different users, BSs, MBSs, and the satellite, which means that each of these constraints will only set boundaries to one user, BS, MBS or the satellite. For example, constraints 
Here, λ n,u,t , ς n,u,t , and ξ n,t are the dual variables.
Meanwhile, since the data rate functions c n,u,t (θ nut ), c n,m,t (ϕ nmt ), and c n,S,t (ε nt ) are independent, one can obtain the augmented Lagrangian function transformed into a form
Here, L u is the Lagrangian function at user u, such that user u ∈ U is obligated to solve a maximization problem in the form:
where X u = {θ u : (21a), (21g), (21n), θ nut ∈ {0, 1} , ∀n ∈ N , t ∈ T } includes the local constraints at user u. Here, θ u = [θ 1u1 , · · · , θ 1uT , · · · , θ N u1 , · · · , θ N uT ] is the vector of data request schemes of user u, with θ nut ∈ {0, 1}. Note that, θ nut = 1 implies that user u requests data service from BS n at time slot t. λ u = [λ 1u1 , · · · , λ 1uT , · · · , λ N u1 , · · · , λ N uT ] is the vector of dual variables related to user u. Also, note that D u (θ u , λ u ) is the dual function at user u. L n is the Lagrangian function at BS n, such that the optimization problem at BS n is defined as follows:
where D n (ϕ n , ε n , ρ n , λ n , ξ n , ς n ) is called the dual function at BS n. Also, note that X n = {ϕ n , ε n , ρ n : (21b) − (21d), (21h), (21k) − (21m), (21o), ϕ n,m,t , ε nt , ρ nut ∈ {0, 1} , ∀m ∈ M, u ∈ U, t ∈ T } includes all the local constraints at BS n. Here,
, and ε n = [ε n1 , · · · , ε nT ] are vectors of the data request schemes at BS n, with ϕ nmt = 1 indicating that BS n requests data service from BS m, ε nt = 1 indicating that BS n requests data service from the satellite, at time slot t. ρ n = [ρ n11 , · · · , ρ n1T , · · · , ρ nU 1 , · · · , ρ nU T ] is the allocation scheme vector at BS n in the studied duration.
, and ξ n = [ξ n1 , · · · , ξ nT ] are the vectors of dual variables related to BS n. Note that, instead of calculating the data rate it can receive from the satellite at slot t by tracking the location of the satellite, a BS n can estimate the data rate based on Proposition 1.
Proposition 1.
Given an allocation vector β, the variation of backhaul data rate c n,S,t caused by the movement of the LEO satellite is: 
Proof. See Appendix B.
As such, using Proposition 1, the BSs can evaluate the satellite backhaul data rates at slot t in the form of c n,S,t−1 +c n,S,t , without introducing unnecessary overhead while tracking the location of the LEO satellite. The Lagrangian function at MBS m is L m . The optimization problem at MBS m is:
where X m = {δ m : (21e), (21i), δ nmt ∈ {0, 1} , ∀n ∈ N , t ∈ T } includes all the local constraints 
where X S = {β : (21f ), (21j), β nt ∈ {0, 1} , ∀n ∈ N , t ∈ T } includes all the local constraints at (21) is then minimized at each user, BS, MBS, and the satellite over dual variables λ, ς, and ξ, with the heavy ball method [32] . With the convergence of the heavy ball algorithm, the market clearance constraints is satisfied, which gives rise to a Walrasian equilibrium of the ISDN system, as the maximal values for the payoffs of each user, BS, MBS, and the satellite are reached.
D. Heavy ball method
The heavy ball method [32] is an efficient sub-gradient method that seeks to find the optimal dual variables that minimizes the dual function, D, by iteratively updating the dual variables λ, ς, and ξ in the opposite direction to the gradient ∇L(λ), ∇L(ς), and ∇L(ξ), respectively. The dual function D is, firstly, computed with initial dual variables λ (0) , ς (0) and ξ (0) . However, the allocation schemes that maximize payoff functions with such initial dual variables, or normalized prices, may not satisfy the market clearance constraints, that is, the data and backhaul service supply may not match the data and backhaul service demand. The mismatch between supply and demand is referred as to violation of the market clearance constrains, which is:
where s
2 , and s
3 , are vectors of market clearance violations at radio access links, terrestrial backhaul links, and satellite backhaul links at iteration k of the heavy ball dual variable updating process, respectively. ρ (k) , δ (k) , and β (k) are the optimal allocation vectors that maximize Lagrangian functions L n , L m , and L S at each BS, MBS, and the satellite in the
, and ξ (k) are the optimal request vectors that maximize Lagrangian functions L u and L n , for all the users and BSs in the system, at iteration k. As these market clearance violations are considered to reach 0 at the Walrasian equilibrium of the ISDN, dual variables are updated iteratively at the BSs, MBSs, and the satellite for the decreased violation values. Precisely, in the studied ISDN, each user and BS report their optimal service request scheme θ (k) , ς (k) , and ξ (k) to their associated BS, MBS, and satellite, at each iteration k. The
BSs will be responsible for updating prices λ based on the market clearance violation s
, where µ
. MBSs are responsible for updating prices ς, based on the market clearance violation s
2 , where µ
. The satellite, at the mean time, is obligated to update prices ξ based on
. Here, λ (k) , ς (k) and ξ (k) are vectors of the dual variables at the k-th iteration, π (k) is the updating step size in the price updating process. Then, the terrestrial users, BSs, MBSs, and the satellite are informed with the updated prices λ (k) , ς
and ξ (k) and will find the optimal solutions of their Lagrangian function maximization problems,
, and β (k) with the updated dual variables. If these new optimal solutions still do not satisfy the market clearance constraints, the dual variables will keep being updated.
E. Complexity and convergence
At each iteration, the complexity of the heavy ball algorithm is O (U N + N (M + 1)). Also, at each iteration of the heavy ball algorithm, the BSs, MBSs, and the satellite broadcast the updated dual variables, the users and the BSs report its service request schemes to the BSs, MBSs and the satellite. The number of information expected to be exchanged in the distributed heavy ball algorithm is K * (U + 2N + M + 1), with K * , a considerably small number, being the index of the iteration when the heavy ball algorithm converges. Meanwhile, the number
The working time limits of each BS, data service request of each user, QoS requirements at each user and BS.
Init: Initialize dual variables λ (0) , ς (0) and ξ (0) , which are the initial normalized prices.
1: Set step k = 1.
2:
for User u = 1 : U do
3:
Solve optimization problem (24) with dual variable λ (k−1) and find the optimal solution θ (k−1) .
4:
Send scheme θ (k−1) to BSs.
5: end for
6: for BS n = 1 : N do
7:
Solve optimization problem (25) with dual variablesλ (k−1) , ς (k−1) and ξ (k−1) and find the optimal solution ρ (k−1) ,
and ε (k−1) .
8:
Compute market clearance violation s
1 , update price λ (k) .
9:
Send schemes ϕ (k−1) and ε (k−1) to MBSs and the satellite, respectively.
10: end for
11: for MBS m = 1 : M do
12:
Solve optimization problem (27) with dual variable ς (k−1) and find the optimal solution δ (k−1) .
13:
14: end for 15: for The satellite do
16:
Solve optimization problem (28) with dual variable ξ (k−1) and find the optimal solution β (k−1) .
17:
3 , update price ξ (k) .
18: end for
19: Set step k = k + 1.
20: repeat
21:
Step 2 until Step 19. of information exchanged in a centralized algorithm would be (U + M + 1) N . However, it is worth noting that, each piece of information being exchanged in the heavy ball algorithm only includes a vector of dual variables or service request schemes. In contrast, every piece of information being exchanged in the centralized algorithm contains not only vectors of dual variables and service request/allocation schemes, but also vectors of QoS requirements, service demands, resource budgets, and other information. In other words, the total amount of information that should be exchanged within the heavy ball algorithm is considerably smaller. Moreover, the Lemma 2. The proposed dual decomposition-heavy ball based algorithm will converge to the Walrasian equilibrium, at which the optimal total payoff is reached in the system, with diminishing step sizes.
Proof. See Appendix D.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For our simulations, we consider a scenario with U = 60 mobile users, N = 10 BSs (including This stems from the fact that, the updating direction of the heavy ball algorithm has a smaller angle towards the optimal result than the sub-gradient algorithm. From Fig. 2(a) , we can see that, the mismatch between the supply and demand of data and backhaul service reaches 0 upon the convergence of the heavy ball algorithm and sub-gradient algorithm where the market clearance constraint is satisfied. Meanwhile, Fig. 2(b) shows that the minimization of D is reached upon the convergence of both algorithms where the total payoff maximization problem (21) is solved.
In such a case, a Walrasian equilibrium scheme is reached at the convergence of the heavy ball algorithm and, also, the sub-gradient algorithm. Fig. 3 shows the convergence of the proposed heavy ball algorithm as the number of DBSs varies. In Fig. 3 , we can see that as the number of DBS increases, the number of iterations needed for convergence increases. This stems from the fact that, as the number of DBSs increases, the number of communication links increases which requires more iterations to find the optimal user association and resource allocation schemes. Fig. 3 also shows that the maximum total payoff decreases as the number of DBSs increases. This is because the data rates at each communication link decrease, with the newly added DBSs introducing significant interference to the ISDN.
In Fig. 4 , we show how, at a Walrasian equilibrium of the studied ISDN, the price of the data service at radio access links and backhaul service at backhaul links varies with the normalized data rate. As normalized data rate increases from 0.1 to 0.5, the prices for both a data service and backhaul service will increase. This is because the users and BSs would submit higher bids for high-rate data and backhaul service. However, the price only slightly increases as normalized data rate increases from 0.3 to 0.5. This stems from the fact that, with the increase in its normalized data rate, a link gets the highest "quote" (or price) of its data or backhaul service for guaranteed adoption, henceforth, the users and BSs will stop proposing higher quotes for this link so as to maintain higher payoffs. centralized optimization method.
In Fig. 6 , we show how the average data rate at a Walrasian equilibrium varies with the number of DBSs. As the number of DBSs increases from 1 to 6, the average data rates at both radio access links and backhaul links decreases. This stems from the fact the newly added DBSs introduce significant interference to the system. Fig. 6 also shows that, the decrease in the average data at backhaul links is higher than the one at radio access links. This is because the interference introduced by a DBS over the backhaul links is larger than the one it introduces to the radio access links. Fig. 7 shows how the amount of data service provided at radio access links vary as the number of DBSs increases. Fig. 7 shows that, as the number of DBS increases, the amount of data service provided at radio access links increases, with the increase of available time resources in the ISDN. From Fig. 7 , we can also see that, as the number of DBSs increases, the amount of data service provided at radio access links increases at a lower speed. This is because a larger number of DBSs yields lower data rates. Fig. 7 also shows that the amount of data service provided at the radio access links stops increasing as the number DBSs increases from 3 to 6 when the satellite is not deployed in the system. This is because, as the number of DBSs increases, the only deployed MBS is not capable of serving all the BSs, which leads to some users not being served. Fig. 8 shows how the average data rate at a Walrasian equilibrium varies with the number of SBSs. In Fig. 8 , we can see that, as the number of SBSs increases from 1 to 6, the average data rates at both radio access links and backhaul links decreases. This stems from the fact the newly added SBSs introduce interference to the system. However, the decrease in data rates caused by adding more SBSs is much smaller than the one caused from increasing the number of DBSs.
This is due to the fact that DBSs can provide LoS links to every other devices in the ISDN and, hence, they can introduce a DBS can introduce a significantly larger interference over the backhaul and radio links. 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a novel joint resource allocation and user association problem in an ISDN system in which satellite backhaul links share time resources with terrestrial backhaul links and terrestrial radio access links. We have formulated this problem using a competitive market in which the data rate of the communication links is optimized distributively with a heavy ball algorithm. Simulation results have shown that, by considering the Walrasian equilibrium in the market, the proposed algorithm can yield over two-fold gain in terms of the number of radio access links with over 40 Mbps rates, and over three-fold gain in terms of the number of backhaul links with over 1.6 Gbps rates. The heavy ball algorithm also yields a 10% improvement in the convergence speed, compared to the sub-gradient algorithm.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Based on (1), (11) , and (14) , the data rate of link I S n at slot t can be given as: 
where d n,S (t) = (x 0 + υtτ − x 2,n ) 2 + (y 0 − y 2,n ) 2 + (f 0 − f 2,n ) 2 is the distance between the satellite and BS n at slot t, with . Also, we define function g (t) in a form of:
g (t) = 10 − ( α +α log 10 d n,S (t)+χ )
such that:
∂g (t) ∂t = − α (x 0 υτ + υ 2 τ t) 10d 
Denote P S = P S L 1 Q M M Q RM Ω n,S,t +Ωc+σ 2 , such that c n,S,t (t) = β * nt B S log 2 (1 + P S g (t)). In such a case: ∂c n,S,t (t) ∂t = β * nt B S ln 2 P S g (t) 1 + P S g (t)
= − αβ * nt B S P S 10 ln 2
((x 0 − x 2,n ) υτ + υ 2 τ t) g (t) (1 + P S g (t)) d 
As each studied time slot has a rather short time duration τ , we can approximate the variation of c n,S,t in one time slot as ∂c n,S,t (t) ∂t τ . This completes the proof.
B. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We first, relax the integer constraints (21p)-(21r) into ρ nut , θ nut , δ nmt , ϕ nmt , β nt , ε nt ∈ [0, 1], and, thus, the maximization problem (21) becomes a convex problem. Given the bounded, closed feasible region defined by (21a)-(21o), (21s), and ρ nut , θ nut , δ nmt , ϕ nmt , β nt , ε nt ∈ [0, 1], the relaxed continuous convex problem must have one optimal solution. Also, considering that the feasible region defined by (21a)-(21s) is not empty, for each optimal solution to the relaxed convex problem, there must exist at least one integer optimal solution to the INLP problem in (21) based on [34] . This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. We first observe that, with the non-summable diminishing updating step size π (k) , the heavy ball algorithm is guaranteed to converge to optimal solutions of the studied dual minimization problem based on [35] . With the convergence of the heavy ball algorithm at iteration K * , market clearance violations tend to be 0, meaning that θ (K * ) = ρ (K * ) , ϕ (K * ) = δ (K * ) and
, and β (K * ) being, respectively, the optimal solutions of payoff maximization problems (24)-(28) at iteration K * . Thus, at the convergence of the heavy ball algorithm, a Walrasian equilibrium in the competitive market is reached.
Also, as the constraints are all linear equalities and inequalities, and the feasible region defined by these constrains have at least one interior point, the strongly duality between the primal total payoff maximization problem (21) and its dual minimization problem holds based on the Slater's condition [32] . Thus, as the heavy ball algorithm converges, the optimal solutions of the total payoff maximization problem (21) must be reached with the heavy ball algorithm. This completes the proof.
